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A Global Perspective on
Current Regulatory Reforms:
Rejection, Relocation, or Reinvention?
ALFRED C. AMAN, JR.*
Dean Alfred Aman 's article addresses recent U.S.
administrations' attempts at regulatory reform and notes that as far
as the actual reforms are concerned, there are more similarities
over time than differences. The globalization of politics and
markets and manufacturing, in particular, has helped create global
political economic forces that militate in favor of various forms of
deregulation and privatization not only in the United States, but in
other western democracies as well. Dean Aman focuses on the
United States, noting that globalization has reduced the effectiveness
of local and national regulators, especially since firms are
increasingly free to choose where to locate plants and employ labor.
He considers the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations'
market-oriented regulatory reforms, and explains their similarities
and continuities in terms of the ways in which modern nation-states
cope with and seek to remain competitive in the global economy.
He notes some important differences among these administrations,
however, and argues that reformers who advocate market
approaches as a means to collective ends, rather than as ends in
themselves, are likely to be more receptive to the development of
new global legal regimes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In The Globalization of Politics, Evan Luard argued that:
the welfare of ordinary men and women no longer depends
primarily on the actions of their own governments. It depends, far
more, on actions and decisions reached, far beyond the frontiers of
their own state, by other governments or by international bodies
taking decisions collectively. Political activity devoted to
determining which political leader or which political party rules in
their own state therefore becomes increasingly irrelevant.'
Luard's suggestion that local politics, parties, and leaders are "increasingly
irrelevant" in a global economy may be overstated but is it fundamentally
wrong? My answer is a qualified "no" for reasons having to do with the
relationship between law and place and, in particular, the dynamics of this
relationship in the context of domestic regulation and deregulation in the
Reagan, Bush, and Clinton Administrations.
One might have expected regulatory reform to have differed
significantly between the Reagan and Bush Administrations and the Clinton-
Gore Administration. When the administrations changed in 1992, some
commentators anticipated substantial changes in the direction of regulation
as well as the possibility of re-regulation in some areas (such as the
environmental area).2 Significant differences in the direction and outcome
of regulatory reform among these administrations, however, have been far
fewer than anticipated, despite marked differences in their political
rhetoric.' I will argue that the reason for this is that the trend toward
1. EVAN LUARD, THE GLOBALIZATION OF POLITICS: THE CHANGED Focus OF POLITICAL
ACTION IN THE MODERN WORLD at vi (1990).
2. See, e.g., Margaret Kriz, Their Turn, NAT'L J., Feb. 13, 1993, at 388; Green Ticket or Thicket:
Democratic Vice Presidential Candidate Albert Gore, Jr. 's Environmental Policies, COMMONWEAL, Aug.
14, 1992, at 4; Danielle Allen and Ronald Bailey, Captain Planet for Veep: Democratic Vice
Presidential Candidate Albert Gore, Jr. 's Environmental Politics, NAT'L REV., Sept. 14, 1992, at 40.
3. The linchpin for President Reagan's administrative policy, set forth in Executive Order 12,291,
3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), is not radically different from President Clinton's Executive Order 12,866, 3 C.F.R.
638 (1993). Executive Order 12,866 does encourage greater openness and efficiency through a variety
of substantive changes, but executive oversight and regulatory cost consciousness still dominate the
regulatory scheme. Colloquium, The Fifth Annual Robert C. Byrd Conference on the Administrative
Process: The First Year of Clinton/Gore: Reinventing Government or Redefining Reagan/Bush
Initiatives?, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 23 (1994) (quoting Thomas Sargentich). For a detailed discussion
of the similarities and differences between the two executive orders, see Ellen Siegler, Executive Order
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deregulation and greater reliance on market forces that began in the 1970s
has continued throughout these administrations. In fact, many of the
deregulatory reforms advocated by the Reagan and Bush Administrations
and those of the Clinton-Gore Administration are quite similar.4 What
accounts for this? This is the main question of this essay.
In Part II, I argue that a global perspective on regulatory issues helps
account for the fact that recent domestic regulatory reforms designed around
conflicting principles have led to essentially the same results. Part III then
reviews the recent history of deregulatory reform in the United States in
more detail, to consider why this should be the case. My argument in Part
III is that the current globalization of politics, markets, capital, and labor
involves factors that have had a significant impact on regulatory outcomes,
domestic policy differences notwithstanding.
Part IV then looks ahead to consider the future of regulatory reforms,
focusing especially on some of the Clinton-Gore proposals to reinvent
government. In the Conclusion, I argue that the proposals to reinvent
government may augur significant regulatory reforms, since these proposals
are more responsive to current global conditions discussed in Part III and
offer global approaches to regulatory reform and institution building. Thus,
the similarities between domestic deregulatory reforms in the recent past
should not be misread as implying that the federal government has no role
to play in affecting the relationship between national and global policy
spheres.
II. GLOBALIZATION AND THE REJECTION, RELOCATION, AND
REINVENTION OF GOVERNMENT
In terms of this symposium's theme of law and place, globalization,
particularly from the viewpoint of multinational corporations, might seem
to render a sense of any particular place irrelevant, except as a decision-
12,866: An Analysis of the New Executive Order on Regulatory Planning and Review, 24 ENvT'L L.
REP. 10,070 (1994).
4. For example, recent Clinton-Gore proposals advocate the abolition of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, and the downsizing of other agencies, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
See Pena Submits Legislation to Sunset ICC, PR Newswire, Apr. 7, 1995, available in WESTLAW,
Wires Database; Timothy Noah & Daniel Pearl, Administration Lays Out Proposals to Trim 4,805 Jobs
Over Five Years, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 1995, at A28 (other targeted agencies include the Small Business
Administration, NASA, and the Interior Department).
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making variable with respect to the efficient location or relocation of a
facility or plant.' In the global economy, "a place" can be "any place" and
thus "no place" at all.6  This sense of place or placelessness has
consequences for law and regulatory reform. The globalization of markets,
the ease with which capital can flow around the world, and the mobility of
industries to locate or expand production in the most efficient places
possible can significantly limit the effectiveness of State-centered
regulators.7 The market orientation of multinational corporations and their
ability to seek cheap labor and minimal regulatory costs are just two of the
factors that exert a strong moderating influence on local efforts at
regulation.8 As a result, there usually are few realistic domestic regulatory
reform options open to nations actively involved in the global economy.
Most of these reforms tend to be distinctly market oriented.9
5. See ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 21ST CENTURY
CAPITALISM 69-70 (1991); SASKIA SASSEN, THE MOBILITY OF LABOR AND CAPITAL: A STUDY IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND LABOR FLOW (1988). Of course, this sense of placelessness will vary
from industry to industry. Moreover, it may vary within industries. Some production in some
manufacturing industries is highly mobile, but other aspects of the business, such as top management or
research and development, may not be. In addition, it is sometimes easier for an industry simply to
expand production in one facility rather than move to another location. No moves are made, but
increased production and business will occur in one part of the world rather than another. But, as will
be argued later, even the theoretical possibility of moving manufacturing around the globe and the actual
impact globalization has on the lives of some people in a community helps fuel a politics that more
broadly blames the impact of globalization in some industries for negative societal impacts in general.
See infra at notes 6 to 13.
Globalization, of course, is not a recent phenomenon, but it is less State-centered now than in
earlier historical periods. Non-governmental, transnational actors such as multinational corporations play
an increasingly significant role in this process. These transnational actors have a very fluid sense of
place when it comes to maximizing their profits. For a theoretical discussion of the global system from
a vantage point broader than that of the nation-state, see generally LESLIE SKLAIR, SOCIOLOGY OF THE
GLOBAL SYSTEM 1-25 (1991) (arguing that an exclusively State-centered approach to the global systems
does not take us far enough. There is a need to focus on, among other things, the transnational practices
of transnational corporations to understand global trends more fully.)
6. World consumption of most manufactured consumer goods, however, remains regionalized
or "placed" in relatively high-income countries. Manufacturing, however, is much more global because
of industry's ability to locate in least-cost jurisdictions and then export its goods to various markets,
especially those in high-income countries.
7. See, e.g., ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1987);
REICH, supra note 5; Robert J.S. Ross, The Relative Decline of Relative Autonomy: Global Capitalism
and the Political Economy of State Change, in CHANGES IN THE STATE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
206 (Edward S. Greenberg & Thomas F. Mayer eds., 1990); Aristide R. Zolberg, Bounded States in a
Global Market: The Uses of International Labor Migrations, in SOCIAL THEORY FOR A CHANGING
SOCIETY 305 (Pierre Bourdieu & James S. Coleman eds., 1991).
8. See generally SASSEN, supra note 5.
9. Regulatory reforms, especially in the western developed world, increasingly have taken the
form of deregulation or privatization. These terms are not necessarily self-explanatory. They can
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Though not all industries within a particular jurisdiction or nation are
equally subject to intense global competition, the existence of global
competition in general contributes to an overall political context that
encourages domestic deregulatory reform proposals that apply across the
board to all industries. Political movements and regulatory trends do not
tend to discriminate among industries once the momentum for certain
reforms is underway.'" Similarly, deregulatory or antiregulatory
movements do not differentiate well among industries. If the costs of
domestic regulation or labor mean that certain industries are more or less
effective global competitors than others, regulation and its costs in general
are a major focus around which a certain kind of deregulatory politics can
develop. Thus, when the effects of the globalization of manufacturing in
certain industries result in the relocation of plants from one part of the world
to another, the negative impact this has on individuals and the communities
in which these facilities closed reinforces the anti-government ideology
underlying broader domestic deregulatory politics and rhetoric. The impact
of global competition on the domestic politics of regulation thus goes well
beyond the industries in which this competition is most intense.
Globalization can, indeed, have very visible, negative effects on
communities and individuals' lives. As noted above, some industries may
close down and relocate to other jurisdictions or countries. Others may lose
market share to global competitors and downsize their workforces
embody various degrees of governmental involvement and responsibility. For example, the State may
wish to privatize certain governmental factions such as prisons which, nevertheless, remain a State
responsibility, with private corporations acting as State agents. On the other hand, the government may
wish to withdraw completely from the regulation of an area leaving, for example, the pricing of oil or
natural gas at the wellhead completely to market forces. Still, in other instances the government may
wish to "deregulate" by substituting market-oriented regulatory approaches for command-control
approaches. Market-based regulation, though less intrusive, still represents a form of regulation. The
State can also fully deregulate, as it did with airline pricing, by returning all such matters to the market.
All of these "deregulatory" approaches, however, have in common at least some reliance on markets and
market forces. Moreover, the language of markets, as well as market values such as efficiency, features
prominently in the political and policy debates leading up to these reforms.
For a discussion of these and other possible meanings of privatization and deregulation, see Paul
Star, The Meaning of Privatization, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 6, 13-20 (1988). See also ALFRED C.
AMAN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA 44-47 (1992).
10. See generally ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A
STUDY IN ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE 3-16 (1969) The concept of monopoly that underlay much New
Deal regulation was susceptible to a variety of meanings and was widely extended to industries such as
some aspects of the trucking and transportation industry that did not technically, from an economic point
of view, suffer such market failure problems. Id.
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considerably. At a minimum, the result for many jurisdictions can be lay-
offs, fewer jobs, and a lower tax base. These effects, in turn, lend practical
significance to abstract political arguments for a minimalist approach to
government, especially when this means the elimination of costs that
arguably might make the company in question more competitive. In short,
the negative impact of globalization-its impact on local industries and
jobs-is one thing, but the ideological commitment to deregulation that
overlooks any particular industry's posture is another. The proof necessary
to help support a political rhetoric that advocates less regulation or none at
all across the board cannot be supplied by economics alone, but requires
ideological support in the form of principles of generality from one
industry's needs to those of another."
In short, the globalization of the economy intensifies certain local
factors, as local jurisdictions are drawn into competition for global
industries. In the United States, the increasing ability of industries to avoid,
in both theory and practice, the regulatory demands of one jurisdiction by
moving or threatening to move to another, 2 fuels an anti-regulatory
rhetoric at "local" levels of any scale of government. The contemporary
scenario is one in which regulatory politics is no longer solely a local or
purely domestic enterprise.
11. Of course, there are also positive effects of globalization. Some industries will benefit from
new markets and jobs will increase. Such positive effects, however, are equated with the market, not
regulation. The negative effects of globalization usually are linked to regulation because any increase
in the costs of production can be viewed as significantly affecting an industry's competitiveness,
particularly if other competitors in other states or countries are not subjected to the same rules.
Regulation in the form of trade barriers has not been particularly successful; nor has it, thus far,
been a politically viable response to the negative effects of globalization. Whether this is due to the
dangers of retaliation and trade wars or the complexity of effectively implementing trade barrier
legislation, such reforms have not, to date, been successful. See generally KENT E. CALDER, STRATEGIC
CAPITALISM: PRIVATE BUSINESS AND PUBLIC PURPOSE IN JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL FINANCE (1993). It
may be, however, that trade barriers are or will be more effective when imposed by regional trading
blocks, rather than individual countries. See generally William J. Davey, European Integration:
Reflections on its Limits and Effects, I IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 185 (1993).
12. See Jeffery Atik, Investment Contests and Subsidy Limitations in the EC, 32 VA. J. INT'L L.
837 (1992); SASSEN, supra note 5. There is debate in the literature regarding the impact of domestic
environmental regulatory costs on the decisions of corporations to relocate. See Richard B. Stewart,
Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2061-86 (1993);
Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Earth As Eggshell Victim: A Global Perspective on Domestic Regulation, 102
YALE L.J. 2107, 2109 n.5 (1993). But when one adds in labor costs as well, it is clear that the overall
domestic regulatory environment certainly is a significant factor considered by companies seeking to
maximize their global competitiveness. See REICH, supra note 5.
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More important, these same global factors also encourage increasingly
intense international competition among states and cities within the U.S. to
attract and keep industries that they believe can create high quality jobs and
economic growth. The battle among nation-states for markets has long been
a global one. The battle for the industries that can produce the goods sold
in those markets and the jobs that go with them is now also global and more
intense than ever before. Though the location of a plant or manufacturing
operation turns on numerous, primarily cost-related factors, low taxes, low
governmental services, and the imposition of minimal regulatory costs on
industries located in these jurisdictions increasingly constitute important
elements of a jurisdiction's strategy to attract industry and jobs to a
particular locale. 3
Individual states and municipalities within the U.S., eager to attract new
investment and to retain their current industries, have a great interest in
gaining control of as many factors as possible affecting firms' decisions to
locate to or remain in the jurisdiction. Thus, closely related to global
incentives for regulatory cost-cutting and the imposition of lower taxes at
the federal, state, and local levels is the increased desire of each particular
jurisdiction seeking economic investment to control its own costs.
Relocating federal regulatory responsibility for costly regulatory programs
in the individual states arguably gives states greater cost control over these
programs and helps make such reforms popular. Thus, though political and
constitutional arguments in favor of reallocating federal power to the states
are not new, the recent re-emergence of the Tenth Amendment as a
politically viable and popular guideline is, nevertheless, a major political
shift in the way we have viewed federal-state relations since the New
Deal. 4 What some commentators call the "radical devolution" of federal
power to the states, 5 is particularly appealing to states as a basis for
13. See JUNE C. NASH, FROM TANK TOWN TO HIGH TECH: THE CLASH OF COMMUNITY AND
INDUSTRIAL CYCLES (1988) (describing an ethnographic study of the transition from heavy manufacturing
to high tech as a New England city casts its lot with the global economy).
14. See, e.g., Senator Bob Dole's remarks on the Senate floor:
This [the 10th Amendment] is an amendment that many here in Washington seem to
have forgotten over the years, as more and more power has been taken away from the states
and placed in the hands of Federal bureaucrats.
As I said in my remarks on the first day of this session, if I have one goal for the 104th
Congress, it is that we will dust off the 10th Amendment and restore it to its rightful place
in our Constitution.
141 CONG. REC. S998 (daily ed. Jan. 17, 1995).
15. News Conference with Democratic Leadership Conference, Fed. News Service, Nov. 17, 1994,
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competing not only with one another for industry and jobs, but also with
other locations around the world. This desire to compete more directly for
the location of the "right" kind of industry in one's state helps fuel the
political rhetoric for returning power to the states; restructuring federal-state
relations to fit the image of a Jeffersonian past may have some political
appeal, but what also drives this realignment is the increasing intensity of
direct competition for economic prosperity among states, which is a major
strand in the political fabric of regulatory reform today. 6
Increasing a state's power to control the costs imposed on its inhabitants
and potential investors through devolution is, however, only one side of
current trends. There are also forces operating simultaneously to reinforce
federal powers. Some of these involve the "old" idea of a national public
interest. 7 Even advanced or radical devolution proposals would not cancel
all of these factors. For example, even if major government programs such
as welfare are returned to the states, some basic national guidelines will
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File (quoting Will Marshall, Progressive Policy
Institute). See, e.g., Personal Responsibility Act of 1995, H.R. 4, 104th Cong., Ist. Sess. (1995).
Republicans have put forward a proposal now advocated by William Bennett and Lamar Alexander-both
former secretaries of the Department of Education-to abolish that department. Bennett has remarked
that, "the national government has become meddlesome, intrusive, and bullying," and "it's now clear that
the federal government will eventually break whatever it touches." Alexander, a candidate for the 1996
presidency, while tempering his remarks somewhat, still believes that the states are more capable at
dealing with certain social issues-education being just one of them. Mary McGrory, Doritos and
Baloney, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 1995, at Cl, C5.
16. See, e.g., Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995);
Private Property Protection Act of 1995, H.R. 925, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (passed the House Mar.
3, 1995, currently in committee in the Senate); Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Analysis Act of 1995,
H.R. 690, 104th Cong., ist Sess. (1995) (currently in committee in the House).
17. An expanded concept of a national public interest is now very much under attack. But it is
important to emphasize that, closely related to the debate over what role the federal government should
or should not play is the question of what theory of the nation-state is viable in the increasingly global
world in which we live. Nation-states remain important, but their role and power seem no longer as clear
or as dominant as before there was as much global interdependence as there is today. More important,
globalization today seems more and more driven by multinational companies, not just nation-states, and
these companies do not necessarily have a clear state attachment or identification. See LESLIE SKLAIR,
supra note 5. For a rethinking of the theory of the State in the context of global migration, see Jost
Delbriick, Global Migration-mmigration-Multiethnicity: Challenges to the Concept of the Nation-
State, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 45 (1994).
What do we expect from the national government? For some, the role of the State at the national
level should primarily be restricted to foreign affairs and, perhaps, some national entitlement programs
like Social Security or crimes that involve more than one state. But communications or environmental
issues, for example, require national standards since neither pollution nor computers, television, radio,
or telephones respect state boundaries. See also R.W. Apple, Jr., States of Mind: You Say You Want
A Devolution, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1995, at D! (for a discussion of the current debate on welfare reform
and the role of the federal government).
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remain necessary to maintain uniform minimum standards and prevent
destructive competition among the states. In addition, governments will not
easily give up power amassed at the federal level since the nation-state has
interests of its own it seeks to preserve, 8 for self-serving bureaucratic
reasons, and also because it is in the interest of nation-states to play an
increasingly active role at the global level. The responsibility of nation-
states goes beyond foreign policy, traditionally conceptualized. National
responsibilities also include world trade, the global environment, and global
economic stability. 9 Effective national participation at the global level
requires a national "presence" in certain domestic areas affected by these
global concerns. For example, if there is no effective national control over
air pollution, it is difficult for a nation to speak for all fifty states and to
enter into serious negotiations at the global level. In short, simultaneously
with the trend toward a devolution of federal power there is also at least the
beginning of an evolutionary trend toward involving the national
government more directly in sharing in the responsibilities of international
governance. At the national level, this trend toward multinational
decisionmaking and problem-solving often expresses itself negatively in
debates over the undue restriction of national sovereignty,2" but
18. See THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (Margaret Weir et al. eds.,
1988).
19. The recent debate over loan guarantees to Mexico is evidence of this. Faced with a devalued
peso and an enormous debt, Mexico turned to the United States for a loan guarantee (totaling about $50
billion) designed to forestall a financial disaster. Many financial experts question the effectiveness of
the loans, given Mexico's complex economic problems. Nevertheless, the U.S. bail-out speaks to the
greater role that foreign markets play in the United States' own financial and political stability. Senator
Tom Daschle's (D-S.D.) remarks during the debate over the loan guarantee are indicative of this:
The loss of jobs as the economy of Mexico responds to the peso devaluation is a price
that will be paid by American workers and their families. The past two years of strong export
sales to Mexico have helped create about 777,000 Americans jobs directly tied to that market.
When that market collapses, those jobs are placed in jeopardy.
That is why we should recognize that the proposed loan guarantee to address Mexico's
economic situation is in our national interest.
141 Cong. Rec. S1732-33 (daily ed. Jan 30, 1995).
It is also significant to note the changing cabinet roles now underway with the Secretary of
Treasury rather than the Secretary of State handling essentially global economic security issues. See
David E. Sanger, The Education of Robert Rubin, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1995, at Cl.
20. An example of this is the recent debate over the World Trade Organization (WTO) in GATT.
Office of the Trade Representative, Final Texts of the GATT Uruguay Round Agreements Including the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (1994) (version of Apr. 15, 1994) [hereinafter
WTO Agreement]. Many fear that the WTO will force substantive policy changes on Member States,
thereby restricting political autonomy. Representative Snowe (R-Me.) expressed these fears during the
debate over GATT:
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international cooperation and multinational agreements are nonetheless
increasing.2' International cooperation and regulation highlights the
importance of the national government's own role at the domestic level.
Still, for the national government to remain a relevant and effective
player in the current global era, with simultaneous pulls from below and
above, some reassessment of the national government is in order. Any
"reinvention" of the national government and its regulatory role must be
realistic, taking into account global competition and the other factors
discussed above, including the global qualities of today's corporate entities.
Globalization means that the line that once may have existed between global
and domestic economic and political forces, as well as the line traditionally
drawn between domestic and international law, is blurry at best and often
non-existent. This is because global political and especially economic forces
are not particularly responsive to national boundaries and thus help forge
transnational economic relationships that are not easily regulated by
domestic governmental bodies alone. Global corporations and the
worldwide web of economic relationships they create represent a very
different kind of entity than traditionally has been the focus of domestic
regulatory regimes. Market approaches to domestic regulation help to
satisfy not only the domestic political demand that regulation be as cost-
effective and as unobtrusive as possible, but they provide the kind of
flexibility that can more easily speak effectively to global entities who do
business in various countries. Particularly when viewed in this larger global
context, globalization means that the central question is no longer
government versus the market, as if this were an either/or choice.22
[W]hat concerns me most about GATT is the new World Trade Organization. The WTO will
be used to enforce GATT's trade regulations, and membership in the WTO is a prerequisite
for participating in GATT.
Frankly, I do not believe our trade negotiators when they say that many of our federal,
state, and local laws are not in danger of being overturned by the WTO.
In my view, the WTO places the principles of free trade above all else. Under the WTO
an individual nation's right to enact its own consumer, environmental, and labor laws would
be jeopardized because these laws could be challenged by other countries as "barriers to free
trade."
140 Cong. Rec. HI 1,509 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 1994).
21. For example, approximately 100 major treaties and agreements dealing with the environment
have gone into effect since 1972, though not all remain in force. For a comprehensive list of these
treaties, see PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT at
xxi-xxvii (1992).
22. See, e.g., AMAN, supra note 9, at 46; IAN AYERS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE
REGULATION 158-62 (1992).
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Reinventing government means coopting the market to serve collective,
public interest ends.
The use of market approaches and rhetoric to secure national public
interest ends is, thus, not only politically pragmatic. A regulatory language
and approach steeped in the market is more likely to be effective when
applied across borders to the global, web-like characteristics of the entities
to which national regulation now applies.23 Indeed, successful government
regulation often takes its structure and form from the entities it seeks to
regulate.24 Corporations once were conceptualized, perhaps accurately, as
single entities in a place or at least in a single country. Today, the
flexibility corporations have to link up, often on a temporary basis, with
suppliers, fabricators, or manufacturing plants around the globe means that
they are no longer self-contained, hierarchical units located in one
jurisdiction.25 New, flexible corporate structures require new flexible
regulatory approaches. Moreover, the low tax, lower regulatory cost
strategies used by jurisdictions to compete for domestic and foreign
investment necessitate greater attention to domestic regulatory costs than
ever before. Market regulatory approaches usually are expected to be
cheaper to enforce as well as to implement when compared to the more
exacting and demanding command-control sets of rules.26
Finally, market approaches to domestic regulation also have politically
pragmatic effects, given domestic political realities. For the national
government to maintain some of its power and to play an effective
regulatory role, it must be efficient and, increasingly, speak the language of
a downsizing corporate America.27 The continued existence of a belief in
a national public interest is at the heart of the need for and the ability of the
23. See REICH, supra note 5, at 113-18.
24. See, e.g., JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 11-12 (Greenwood Press 1974)
(1966) ("when government concerns itself with the stability of an industry it is only intelligent realism
for it to follow the industrial rather than the political analogue"). For an elaboration of this point, see
Aman, supra note 12, at 2117-19.
25. The concept of the "virtual corporation" illustrates this idea. The "virtual corporation" refers
to the idea that, with increasing mobility of computing, corporations can be spread across time zones and
around the world, rather than following the traditional corporate design of a single entity in a single
place. See JEREMY RIFKIN, THE END OF WORK (1995).
26. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives,
13 COLUM. J. ENVT'L L. 153 (1988).
27. This economic regulatory discourse resonates well with current popular management literature
advocating various approaches to a "mean and lean" organization. See, e.g., PETER SENGE, THE FIFTH
DISCIPLINE (1990).
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national government to reinvent itself. Coopting the language of the market
may further this goal, but on a variety of issues there is increasing debate
over whether national governmental action is necessary at all, assuming
markets can work at the state and local levels. If, however, globalization is
not automatically to mean a return to a loose confederation of states in
competition with one another, a continued, if somewhat modified, cautious
and less ambitious national regulatory role is necessary. Market rhetoric,
market forces and values, and market regulatory approaches may provide the
compromise needed between what individual states see as the minimal
public interest advantage to be gained by national regulation and the added
competitive advantage they might secure in the global market if left to their
own (presumably cheaper and more flexible) regulatory and deregulatory
devices. Market approaches are less intrusive and usually cheaper to
implement in the short run,28 and, thus, may be a politically more
acceptable way for the national government to redefine its role and provide
at least some sense of what the national public interest may be in a variety
of areas, from welfare to the environment.
For a number of reasons, globalization thus restricts the range of
realistic regulatory reforms national government can undertake. Taking a
global perspective on domestic regulatory politics helps explain why
regulatory reform does not necessarily differ dramatically in outcome when
one compares the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton Administrations. The
pressures of global competition, the nature of the corporate entities involved,
as well as domestic political pressure to minimize costs and maximize
discretion at all levels of government militate in favor of new, more market-
oriented forms of regulatory reform. Still, it would be a mistake to assume
that similarities in outcome imply that there are no significant differences
between their market-based positions. There often are very significant
differences in both the goals and the assumptions behind the market rhetoric
used by reformers today.
The market has very different meanings for different reformers. For
some, the global market is just another reason to draw a very bright line
between a federal role and the freedom of the private sector. For others, the
28. Of course, particularly in the environmental arena, if market approaches are not effective and
more drastic action is necessary at a later point, such action can be more costly the longer the problem
exists. There is a need for more empirical studies dealing with the effectiveness of domestic regulatory
regimes that rely heavily on market devices to achieve their ends.
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global market is a new factor to be considered when analyzing old
regulatory problems-the global market being a factor that militates in favor
of more cost-effective, less intrusive approaches to solving regulatory
problems.2 9 Still, for others, the global market requires the formulation of
new problems and issues in which the linkage between national regulatory
regimes and global regulatory regimes is crucial.3° Thus, even though all
of these administrations advocate market-oriented regulatory reforms, they
differ considerably when one considers their fuindamentally different starting
points.
These differences in premises and goals are significant because they
indicate the extent to which one sees market approaches and privatization
as an end in themselves, or simply a means to achieving public interest,
national goals. For those to whom market rhetoric means privatization and
individual freedom, current domestic regulatory reforms are a step in the
direction of a laissez-faire domestic and world economy, an increasingly
weak national government, and increased devolution of power to the states.
Those who see the market as a means to an end in which the national
government has a role to play, however minimal, are more likely to
approach global issues in a manner that leaves open the possibility of new,
global regulatory regimes. Indeed, beneath the similarities of the new
domestic public law order emerging are differences in the willingness and
ability of the government to harmonize national regulation with global,
international regulatory approaches and to support extending the global reach
of regulation when necessary.3 For those reformers to whom the market
represents a new regulatory technique for achieving public interest goals,
these national regulatory reforms are seen as connected to an emerging
global regulatory order of which GATT, NAFTA, and global agreements
29. For a discussion of these different perspectives and how they played out during the
deregulatory reforms of the Reagan and Bush Administrations, see AMAN, supra note 9.
30. Thus, for example, NAFTA was seen by the Clinton Administration as not only a free trade
agreement but the start of a process of harmonization of environmental laws in the United States,
Mexico, and Canada. For Republican Party reformers as well as many critics of NAFTA, however, the
agreement was viewed more as a free trade agreement. They had less interest or faith in the
establishment or effectiveness of environmental side agreements.
31. The emphasis on markets, rather than harmonization, however, is apparent in recent attempts
to add Chile to NAFTA. Chile may be invited to join NAFTA before it revamps or harmonizes its
environmental laws. See International Trade, Grassley Confident on Chile Fast-Track If Labor and
Environment Are Kept Out, Daily Rep. Executives (BNA), Apr. 7, 1995, at 67, available in LEXIS, News
Library, CURNWS File.
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such as the Montreal Protocol for the Protection of the Ozone Layer are but
the beginnings of a new, more globalized nation-state, one in which
domestic regulation may increasingly look more like international
regulation,3 2 but also one in which greater deference must be paid to the
lawmaking powers of other jurisdictions, including international bodies.33
Part III will develop these themes more concretely by means of a
comparison between the Reagan and Bush Administrations' approaches to
domestic reform and the regulatory reforms currently proposed by the
Clinton-Gore Administration in its attempt to reinvent government. In
general, this comparison helps illustrate not only that the globalization of
politics and markets has important implications for domestic approaches to
regulatory issues, but also that this is a two-way street. Domestic politics
and agents can exert significant controls-both brakes and acceleration--on
the pace and content of globalization. At times, as in the Reagan
Administration, domestic politics and institutions can temper globalizing
deregulatory forces. At other times, as in the Clinton-Gore Administration,
globalization and the domestic political problems it presents can
substantially limit the range of domestic regulatory responses, resulting in
the continuation of essentially market-based approaches to regulation and
continued trends toward deregulation and privatization in a variety of areas.
The result is both the broadening of economic discourses to encompass
values and goals beyond market efficiency, and the narrowing of traditional
regulatory discourses that, often inappropriately, underestimated cost as a
significant limiting factor in achieving certain regulatory ends.
III. DEREGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
To provide the necessary background for our comparison of the Reagan,
Bush, and Clinton Administrations and to understand more fully the recent
history of deregulatory reform in the United States, it is useful to begin the
32. Market-oriented domestic regulation increasingly resembles current international approaches
to issues in that it relies more on incentives, less on coercion, more on the market and less on specific,
substantive rules, and it increasingly deals with entities that truly are global in their makeup and
operation.
33. In addition, so-called home-based regulation in areas such as banking may become
increasingly popular. Such approaches recognize that more than market-based regulation may be
necessary in some areas and are willing to allow foreign banks to do business in their country if they
are satisfied that the foreign banks are appropriately regulated by their home-country.
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discussion with the Carter Administration. The use of market approaches
to regulation and legislative deregulatory reform first began in a major way
in that administration." The Carter Administration's approach to the
deregulation of airlines is particularly instructive to our consideration of the
regulatory reform similarities and differences among the Reagan, Bush, and
Clinton-Gore Administrations.
For the Carter Administration, domestic airline deregulation was both
politically pragmatic and, from a microeconomic point of view, theoretically
correct. The economic theory underlying deregulation of this industry was
not presented as necessarily being anti-government or anti-State, from a
political or philosophical point of view. The assumption was that the State
should intervene if there was market failure involved. If a market could
work, however, State regulation was not necessary, especially if the market
was expected to reach results more favorable to consumers than those
achieved by regulation. For airline deregulators, there was no market failure
when it came to the airline industry. An airplane was, in the words of
Alfred Kahn, Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), simply a
"marginal cost with wings."35
The politics of airline deregulation was also decidedly pragmatic from
a domestic political point of view. Deregulation promised to lower
consumer fares and increase customer service.36 This reform effort was
aimed at the regulation of what once was a fledgling industry, but one that
advocates of deregulation now perceived as a regulatory-induced cartel,
regulated by an agency captured by the very industry it was designed to
regulate. 7
Safety regulation was excluded from this calculus. That was to continue
to be handled, independently, by the Federal Aviation Administration
34. The Carter Administration also was the first administration extensively to appoint economists
to independent regulatory agencies. For example, several appointees to the Interstate Commerce
Commission were economists, as was the Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), Alfred Kahn.
See THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 273-82 (1984). The Carter Administration was
also the only administration in recent times to abolish a New Deal agency, the CAB.
35. Elizabeth E. Bailey & William J. Baumol, Deregulation and the Theory of Contestable
Markets, I YALE J. ON REG. 111, 128 (1984).
36. Airline Deregulation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705-54 (1978) (codified as amended
at 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1303-1552 (1988)) [hereinafter ADA]. For a general discussion of the efforts to
deregulate the airline industry, see Stephen G. Wood et al., Regulation, Deregulation and Re-Regulation:
An American Perspective, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REv. 381 (1987).
37. Wood, supra note 36, at 390-91.
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(FAA). The assumption was that economic competition would not affect
safety and, in any event, the Federal Aviation Administration would
continue its regulation of these matters. Another key assumption was that
real competition would emerge in the airline industry because the antitrust
laws in effect would be vigorously enforced.38 All of this was strongly
backed by most Democrats, led by Senator Edward Kennedy.39 Invoking
a return to the market as serving the public interest, Congress abolished the
CAB with the Deregulation Act of 1978.'
But deregulation by Democrats did not have the cach6 that deregulation
had during the Reagan revolution, though, in many ways, Democrats were
more successful at the legislative reform level.4 1 Deregulation took hold
as a political rallying cry during the 1980s and the political rationales for
deregulation became increasingly shrill and ideological. "Getting
government off the backs of people" was the slogan of the day. This was
necessary not simply because markets might work in many instances where
regulation was then the norm, but also because some deregulators believed
that most State intervention interfered with fundamental political liberties.
Some advocates of deregulation in the Reagan Administration thus had a
principled complaint: government was not only incompetent and costly, it
also interfered with individual economic freedom. Those that took this view
tended to see potential market successes everywhere. Those who were more
pragmatic tended to have a greater sense of the potential for market failure
and the need for regulation-at the very least to ensure that a market could
be established, or, more broadly, to ensure there was an opportunity for a
collective public response to important economic policy issues. The more
radical, philosophically-oriented deregulatory reforms proposed by the
38. See Stephen Breyer, Antitrust, Deregulation, and the Newly Liberated Marketplace, 75 CAL.
L. REv. 1005 (1987); Louis B. Schwartz, Comment: Some Additional Safeguards for the Newly
Liberated Marketplace, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1049 (1987); Alfred E. Kahn, Comment: Deregulatory
Schizophrenia, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1059 (1987).
39. Stephen Breyer, now Justice Breyer, was a staff member of the Judiciary Committee, chaired
by Senator Kennedy, and was one of the primary staff architects of these proposals. See STEPHEN
BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 317-40 (1982).
40. ADA, supra note 36. The ADA called for a cessation of the Civil Aeronautic Board's
authority to determine rates and practices of all air carriers by January 1, 1983, and for a complete
abolition of the agency by January 1, 1985. 49 U.S.C. app. § 155 !(a)(2)(3) (1988).
41. For a discussion of how the bureaucracy actually grew during the Reagan years, see AYRES
& BRAITHWAITE, supra note 22, at 7-10.
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Reagan Administration and their political effectiveness are more fully
understood by examining the global context in which they were proposed.
There was a significant global backdrop to the deregulatory initiatives
of the 1970s and especially the 1980s that gave added impetus to the
political viability of these reforms. This is particularly apparent when we
look beyond domestic airlines to manufacturing industries in general.
Intense global competition in a number of key industries has been increasing
ever since the countries most devastated by World War I-Germany and
Japan-were able to rebuild and then re-enter the global economy.42
Moreover, other, lesser-developed countries began successfully to enter the
economic fray.43 Industries long thought of as mainstays in the United
States-the auto industry, the steel industry, the electronics industry, to
name just a few-began to decline. They were being defeated by global
competitors who could produce similar or even better products at less
cost.44
Global competition was a compelling reason for domestic deregulatory
reform. The domestic refrain of "We're No. 1" masked the reality of our
new global context, which was that the United States, while still perhaps the
largest economy in the world, was no longer the only major economic
power. It was losing some of its global economic power, but all of its
essentially unchallenged control of the global market place. More
importantly, for purposes of understanding the convergence of global forces
and domestic rhetoric, that loss easily and plausibly could be represented by
domestic politicians as one of the predicted consequences of overregulation,
especially federal regulation. Such representations were self-fulfilling. The
Reagan-Bush regulatory discourse used this new global context to reinforce
an ideological preference for private ordering. Lower taxes meant less
money to fund governmental agencies, regulatory programs, and initiatives
and, in response to the growing deficit that resulted, required more
governmental austerity. In effect, this put substantial pressure on the federal
government to downsize, not unlike much of corporate America.
The Bush Administration largely continued the policy thrust of the
domestic deregulatory program begun in earnest by the Carter
Administration in the 1970s, and pursued in a more ideologically forceful,
42. PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS 416-18, 425-27 (1980).
43. RICHARD ROSECRANCE, THE RISE OF THE TRADING STATE 137-38 (1986).
44. Id. at 141.
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if less legislatively successful manner, by the Reagan Administration
throughout the 1980s.45 The Bush Administration, however, linked its
domestic deregulatory reforms even more directly with the need for
domestic industries to compete globally.46 For example, it established the
Council on Competitiveness headed by Vice President Dan Quayle. This
body had as its primary task the rejection of proposed and existing
regulations that it believed undermined U.S. global competitiveness.
Competitiveness and, presumably, U.S. jobs in U.S.-based industries were
sought and anticipated as the likely results of an aggressive, deregulatory,
anti-government campaign.47
From a global perspective, a deregulatory approach grounded in
individual freedom easily accommodated a vision of the State as relatively
independent and a distinct and sovereign member of the international
community of States, a State that was, in fact, flexing its muscle as it
deregulated in the face of new realities. Deregulation under Reagan-Bush
responded to globalization by recasting its effects into domestic causes that
securely tied the globalization of markets, politics, and law to the very
immediate concerns of local politics. For these administrations, big
government was the problem. Private enterprise, large and small, was the
answer.
The laissez-faire philosophy and the domestic political rhetoric often
reminiscent of the 1920s coincided perfectly with the domestic political
45. The Reagan Administration was not successful at repealing any significant statutory programs;
instead it adopted a court and agency-oriented strategy. AMAN, supra note 9, at 43-44. The success of
this strategy depended in large part on the nature of the regulation and the agency itself. The Reagan
Administration lost its major court battles in health and safety areas, while it was more successful in
communication and commercial areas. See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
46. President Bush's memorandum imposing a moratorium on new regulation and a review of old
regulations sought to eliminate costs and advance economic growth, thereby furthering our global
competitiveness. President Bush first announced this moratorium in his 1992 State of the Union Address,
stating:
I have, this evening, asked major Cabinet departments and Federal agencies to institute
a 90-day moratorium on any new Federal regulations that could hinder growth. In those 90
days, major departments and agencies will carry out a top-to-bottom review of all regulations,
old and new, to stop the ones that will hurt growth and speed up those that will help growth.
President's Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 28 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 170, 172 (Jan. 28, 1992). Bush extended the moratorium for another 120 days, and again
until the expiration of his term. President's Remarks on Regulatory Reform, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 726, 727 (Apr. 29, 1992); Remarks Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican
National Convention in Houston, 28 WKLY. CoMI.PREs.Doc. 1462, 1466 (Aug. 24, 1992).
47. Corporate downsizing and productivity gains, however, seemed to cut jobs at a faster rate than
cost savings generated by deregulation could create them.
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needs of the conservative administrations of the 1980s. Ironically,
deregulation could thus be seen as a strong, State-centered approach to a
global challenge, as if dismantling the administrative State was but one of
many free choices open to a sovereign State. Applying a global perspective
to these events, however, makes clear that it was also the weakness of the
State due to the impact of global economic forces beyond its political
-control that made some version of this legal and political response
inevitable. To characterize deregulation and a more minimalist approach to
national government as a victory for the forces of economic freedom had a
certain domestic political effect. What was, to some extent, an inevitable
trend from a global point of view, was embraced as a brave, ideological
choice to underscore the fact that States should not interfere with private
enterprise. The current refrain that U.S. citizens want a smaller, or at least
more efficient, national government implies that there is a choice in this
matter when, in fact, there may not be.
There were, of course, relatively easy ways to accomplish the
deregulatory reforms proposed by Reagan-Bush reformers. Congress could
have amended or repealed the laws that created and empowered existing
federal agencies-especially the New Deal agencies. Congress, however,
especially the Democratic Congresses in existence during most of the 1980s
(and the Democratic House throughout this time), was not about to
deregulate so completely or in an across-the-board manner. The forces of
globalism that Reagan-Bush so effectively translated into an ideological
form of domestic reform were, ultimately, constrained by Congress and the
courts.
As I have written elsewhere, 48 the Reagan-Bush deregulatory strategy
eventually sought to by-pass the Congress by using the courts and the
agencies themselves to achieve its deregulatory goals. But deregulating
pursuant to the very statutes that created the regulatory structures these
administrations sought now to remove, required that these agencies infuse
their regulatory regimes with market approaches, if not market ideology.
Courts were generally willing to approve of agency attempts to rescind rules
if they could plausibly argue that the market forces they sought to substitute
were in the public interest.49  The courts usually were not inclined,
48. AMAN, supra note 9, at 43-44.
49. This is well illustrated by the federal court cases that arose out of the deregulation of both the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). The
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however, to allow market forces to substitute for regulatory approaches
where Congress, particularly in various health and safety statutes, had
rejected the market.50 Nor were the courts willing to adopt constitutional
judicial reaction to deregulation of the FCC was generally favorable, given the nature of the
congressional mandate, and the changed perception for the need to regulate the broadcast industry. See,
e.g., Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
This case concerned the FCC's decision to deregulate the commercial radio industry by eliminating
quantitative processing guidelines for nonentertainment programming, formal ascertainment procedures,
commercialization processing guidelines, and programming log requirements. Id. at 1419. The FCC's
deregulation was based on the belief that "current conditions in the radio marketplace permit the
Commission to reduce direct government control of licensees while still remaining faithful to its statutory
mandate to regulate in the public interest." Id. at 1420.
The court agreed, upholding all of the deregulation decisions except the elimination of the program
log requirement. Id. at 1443. The court found nothing in the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C.
§§ 151-613 (1988)-the FCC's enabling statute-to prevent deregulation. The statute's mandate, that
of a broad-based public interest standard, gives the FCC a great deal of discretion to formulate its public
policy goals. 707 F.2d at 1432.
Like the FCC, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) also has been fairly successful at
deregulation. When the ICC was founded, Congress was primarily concerned with the railroads'
monopoly power. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (current version in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). By the mid-1900s, however, the railroads no longer held such a
dominant position. In 1980, Congress responded to this change by passing legislation designed to
increase the flexibility of action under the current regulatory scheme. See Staggers Rail Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980).
Congress believed that decreased regulation would translate into increased competition, thus
enabling the rail industry to provide services more effectively. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1430, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1981). Congress also passed several statutes to effectuate its deregulation goals.
49 U.S.C. §§ 11343(e), 10505(a), 11343(e) (1988).
For the most part, the ICC's deregulation has been upheld. See, e.g., Baltimore & O.R.R. v. ICC,
826 F.2d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that in measuring the potential harm to users of railroad track
that the railroad sought to abandon, the ICC could consider the possibility of the user purchase of or
subsidy to the railroad's operation); Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. ICC, 819 F. 2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(upholding ICC exemption for trackage rights agreements); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States,
817 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (upholding ICC's promulgation of regulations for competitive access
hearings).
There are some exceptions to the cases listed above. See, e.g., Regular Common Carrier
Conference v. United States, 820 F. 2d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that ICC impermissibly granted
an exemption from a prior approval hearing to a railroad seeking to acquire six trucking companies);
General Chem. Corp. v. United States, 817 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that ICC's determination
that railroads were not market dominant was arbitrary and capricious).
Commentators have pointed out that there was some tension between the courts and the ICC
concerning deregulation, but this tension is not based on philosophical grounds. Instead, the courts were
constrained to permit certain deregulation because it conflicted with statutes that remained in force. Until
Congress clarifies the situation by repealing the conflicting statutes, the courts will be forced to abide
by them. For a detailed commentary on the ICC's deregulation efforts, see Mary A. Wallace, The D.C.
Circuit Review: Interstate Commerce Commission, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 937 (1988). President
Clinton has proposed to abolish the ICC altogether. See generally Robert Pear, The Clinton Budget:
The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1995, at Al.
50. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). In this
case, the Supreme Court upheld the D.C. Circuit's holding that the National Highway Transportation
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separation of powers arguments that would, in effect, render certain New
Deal agencies unconstitutional because they unduly interfered with
Executive power."1 Quite apart from the ideological fervor with which
deregulation was proposed, the result was that national politics and national
institutions, especially the courts, limited the extent to which the Reagan and
Bush administrations could go in this regard. Most New Deal agencies
remained in place, though many were less active and much more market
oriented. 2 The deregulation and market approaches upheld by the courts
were viewed as public interest governmental responses to regulatory
issues. 3
How different is the Clinton-Gore approach from that of Reagan and
Bush? And how different are the Reagan-Bush proposals once they were
tempered by Congress and the courts? Rather than reject outright or
substantially impede the regulatory role of the federal government, as the
Reagan and Bush Administrations unsuccessfully sought to do in many
cases, and certainly as the new Republican legislative majority in the House
Administration (NHTSA) had failed to provide an adequate explanation for repealing the passive restraint
standard. This standard required automobile manufacturers to install passive restraint devices in all new
automobiles over a three-year period beginning in September 1981. Shortly after assuming office, the
Reagan Administration decided to delay implementation of the rule for one year, citing numerous cost
and compliance problems. In addition, the delay was designed to give the NHTSA time to review the
entire passive restraint issue, opening up the possibility that the standard would be completely rescinded.
Because of this possibility, several insurance companies and consumer groups brought legal action to
challenge NHTSA's rescission of the standard. See AMAN, supra note 9, at 63-77; see also Larry W.
Thomas et al., The Courts and Agency Deregulation: Limitations on the Presidential Control of
Regulatory Policy, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 27, 32-34 (1987).
For other cases adverse to the Reagan Administration's deregulation attempts at the agency level,
see Public Citizen v. Steed, 733 F.2d. 93 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (invalidation of NHTSA's indefinite
suspension of treadware grading standards); Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Donovan, 722 F.2d.
795 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (invalidation of the rescission of a thirty-nine year-old regulation prohibiting
homework in the knitted outerwear industry); Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, 702
F.2d. 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration had abused
its discretion in not issuing an emergency standard reducing worker exposure to ethylene oxide).
51. See AMAN, supra note 9, at 9-13.
52. One way of highlighting the impact of deregulation at the agency level is by noting the
significant shift in the numbers of Administrative Law Judges functioning in economic regulatory
agencies such as the FCC or the ICC, which were often the targets of the deregulatory reforms of the
1970s and 1980s. "Shortly after the APA was passed, there were 196 ALJ's--64% of whom (125) were
assigned to economic regulatory agencies and 6.6% (or 13) to the Social Security Administration. By
1984, there were 1121 ALJ's .... Only 6.5% or 73 ALJ's were in the 12 economic regulatory agencies,
while 67,8% or 760 ALJ's were in Social Security." ALFRED AMAN & WILLIAM MAYTON,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 200 n.7 (1993) (relying on a study by Jeffrey Lubbers of the United States
Administrative Conference).
53. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 49.
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of Representatives now seeks to do, again,54 the Clinton Administration
seeks to reinvent government largely in the image of a lean and cost-
effective government corporation. The regulatory politics in the 1990s has
a distinct corporate rhetoric that continues the privatizing trend, but in a
manner that keeps the federal government involved and a collective sense
of a national public interest relevant. Government is not being rejected as
ideologically inappropriate, but it is being converted to forms, approaches,
and goals that do not differ substantially from those of the private sector.
Rhetorically, the Clinton-Gore approach remains positive in terms of the role
to be played by the national government. When it comes to translating their
proposals into law, however, most of the regulatory approaches proposed are
very much steeped in the market and are of a piece with the general
direction of regulatory reform for the last twenty years. Part IV will now
examine some of the reinvention of government rhetoric and some of the
reforms it generates.
IV. REINVENTING GOVERNMENT AND CORPORATE RHETORIC
If it was Congress and the courts that filtered and limited the more
stridently ideological aspects of the Reagan and Bush Administrations'
deregulatory attempts, it is arguably the globalization of markets, capital,
and economic problems that limits the way in which regulatory reform is
now conceptualized, even by those who are not philosophically opposed to
an activist national government. The National Performance Review (NPR
or the Report), a report written largely under the direction of Vice President
Gore,55 must be read against a global backdrop of increasing global
54. See, e.g., Regulatory Transition Act of 1995, H.R. 450, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (passed
the House Feb. 24, 1995, currently in committee in the Senate) (regulatory moratorium legislation);
Private Property Protection Act of 1995, H.R. 925, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (passed the House Mar.
3, 1995, currently in committee in the Senate) (takings legislation); Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit
Analysis Act of 1995, H.R. 690, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (currently in committee in the House).
These provisions would in many instances make agency action difficult, if not practically impossible, but
they seek to restrain rather than replace the federal regulation to which they apply. Other approaches,
including some Clinton proposals have singled out some agencies for abolition. See Pena Submits
Legislation to Sunset ICC, supra note 4 (Clinton Administration targeting the Interstate Commerce
Commission); Christopher Georges, Senate Republicans Begin to Give Details on Spending Cuts They
Intend to Seek, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 1995, at A4 (Texas Senator Phil Gramm and Senate Majority
Leader Bob Dole have separately proposed abolishing the Department of Education).
55. Vice President Al Gore, Report of the National Performance Review, From Red Tape to
Results: Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less (Sept. 7, 1993) [hereinafter National
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competition for markets and investment, declining nation-state sovereignty
and power, and a view of the nation-state that sees as one of its primary
roles the attraction and retention of jobs and a high level of economic
prosperity within its borders. Seen in this light, the language of public law
and the regulatory policy it creates continues to rely heavily upon market
approaches, rhetoric, and goals. But unlike the Council on Competitiveness
headed by Vice President Quayle, 6 the Gore Commission viewed the
national government in essentially a positive light. It was not the
government versus the market, but an instance of the government coopting
the market.
The Report begins with the premise that government to date has been
inefficient and needs to be changed, not because it is philosophically wrong
for the national government to play an active regulatory role, but because
it can be more efficient in the way it operates and the way it defines and
approaches its goals." The first chapter, entitled "Cutting Red Tape," thus
focuses on governmental functions similar to those of most businesses and
makes recommendations for streamlining the budget process, decentralizing
personnel policy, and streamlining procurement, as well as focusing on more
purely governmental tasks such as reorienting the Inspectors General,
eliminating regulatory overkill, and empowering state and local
governments.5 8 Flexibility, decentralization of authority, efficiency, and
least-cost alternatives to achieving goals set collectively and not solely
through the market are the main themes of this chapter. Government is not
in opposition to the market, rather government seeks to make use of the
market and market forces to further more efficiently and cheaply collective,
public interest goals.
The Report also suggests a new rhetoric for defining the relationship of
the individual to the State. The next chapter, entitled "Putting Customers
First," sees citizens as customers. The federal government is to become
Performance Review]. For a discussion of this report, see Jeffery S. Lubbers, Better Regulations: The
National Performance Review's Regulatory Reform Recommendaitons, 1994 DuKE L.J. 1165 (1994);
Daniel P. Rodriquez, Management, Control, and the Dilemmas of Presidential Leadership in the Modern
Administrative State, 1994 DUKE L.J. 1180; Paul R. Verkuil, Is Efficient Government an Oxymoron?,
1994 DUKE L.J. 1221.
56. See Vice President Dan Quayle, Remarks to the Food and Drug Law Institute Conference
Regarding the President's Council on Competitiveness, Fed. News Service, Dec. I1, 1991, available in
LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
57. National Performance Review, supra note 55, at ii.
58. Id. at 13.
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"customer friendly."59 Thus, this chapter considers how to "give customers
a voice-and a choice"; how to eliminate unnecessary government
monopolies, making service organizations, such as the Government Printing
Office, compete; how to create market dynamics within the public sector;
and how to use market mechanisms to solve problems.' Here, the explicit
assumption is that:
[g]overnment cannot create a program for every problem facing the
nation. It cannot simply raise taxes and spend more money. We
need more than government programs to solve our problems. We
need governance. Governance means setting priorities, then using
the federal government's immense power to steer what happens in
the private sector.6
Reliance on incentives, direct guidelines, and the force the government can
wield when it acts as a consumer are emphasized.
Chapter Three, entitled "Empowering Employees To Get Results,"
continues the Report's essentially corporate, managerial focus. It seeks to
improve the quality of government by improving government's ability to
manage. Thus, it recommends that agencies decentralize decision-making
power within the government and then hold individual governmental
managers accountable for their results. It advocates giving federal workers
the tools they need to do their jobs, including employee training, new
information technology and the training to use it, and the development of a
strategic plan for effectively using information technology throughout the
federal government.62
Chapter Four, entitled "Cutting Back To Basics," focuses on how to
eliminate governmental waste, defined as obsolete programs, duplicative
programs, or special privileges.63 "Cutting Back" also has a revenue side.
59. Id. As Vice President Gore states in the Report: "A lot of people don't realize that the
federal government has customers. We have customers. The American people." Id. at 43 (quoting Al
Gore, Town Meeting, Dept. of Housing and Urban Development (Mar. 26, 1993)).
60. National Performance Review, supra note 55, at 44. The Report states, "[w]e will use federal
powers to structure private markets in ways that solve problems and meet citizens' needs-such as for
job training or safe workplaces-without funding more and bigger public bureaucracies." Id.
61. Id. at 62.
62. This chapter also discusses how to enhance the quality of work life for federal employees,
noting a strong correlation between employee and customer satisfaction. Finally, chapter three seeks to
promote a labor-management partnership. Id. at 65-91.
63. Id. at 94.
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It advocates collecting more money for the government's use from greater
reliance on user fees, better debt collection, and the elimination of fraud.'
At the same time, there are to be investments in greater governmental
productivity.
65
The NPR, in short, treats government like a business because
government buys and sells goods in the process of carrying out its functions.
In addition, it is expected to deliver its services-regulatory and
otherwise-as efficiently as possible. When government acts as a buyer or,
in effect, a consumer, it needs to do so efficiently. Still, government is so
unusually large a customer that it cannot ignore the impact it can have on
the modification, creation, or destruction of markets. When it acts as a
seller of services, citizens are its customers. Throughout, the Report thus
emphasizes that the government, in both its roles as provider and consumer,
is like any good business or smart consumer. It must be flexible, capable
of rapid change, and efficient. These essentially market values result in
legal approaches to regulation that are not significantly different in content
or direction from those previously advocated by the Reagan and Bush
Administrations.
What implications do the market metaphor, rhetoric, values, and goals
have for new forms of U.S. public law in the 1990s, quite apart from
whether they are proposed by Democrats or Republicans? The next
subsections examine three specific areas: (1) providing for agency revenue
by new indirect and direct approaches to agency finance; (2) new
governmental agency structures that are based on private models; and (3)
market-based approaches to agency regulation.
These examples increasingly are typical of the way the administrative
state in the 1990s is conceptualized. They represent the national
government's attempt to remain relevant in a global world of increasing
competition and declining national importance and sovereignty. They also
suggest the following hypothesis: the larger the scale of the regulatory
undertaking, the more minimalist and market-oriented the regulatory
64. Id.
65. Id. The Report recommends the elimination of bias against long-term governmental
investments in productivity-enhancing equipment such as computers, and the creation of agency
innovation funds. The Report advocates reallocation of agency budgets with a view towards cutting costs
and freeing up funds for investments in productivity, such as computers. Id. at 1 10-I !. The Report
concludes by recognizing a need for wholesale change, including the cultural change necessary for
sustaining fundamental change and increased risk-taking. Id. at 121-22.
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approaches are likely to be. When the global marketplace is viewed as
"everyplace," the ability of global entities operating in that marketplace to
choose other regulatory environments makes rather loose national market
regulatory approaches more likely. The result is the emergence of a new
mix of private and public approaches to national regulatory regimes.
A. Financing Agency Regulation
Lower taxes and deficit reduction have meant significant cuts in agency
budgets. President Clinton came into office advocating a fourteen percent
reduction in administrative costs in most agency budgets over a four-year
period.66 This type of budget cut makes it more difficult for governmental
entities to carry out their missions, unless they redefine their goals,
reallocate responsibilities, and realign priorities. Of necessity, this requires
new approaches to agency financing.
1. Indirect Agency Financing
Enforcement of most regulatory regimes is costly and requires a large
number of lawyers and staff, and often litigation, to be successful.6 7 One
indirect form of financing agency action is to cut back on some agency
activities and reallocate funds elsewhere. Less enforcement is one likely
candidate for cutting;6" however, this theoretically can be more than just
a cost-saving strategy. It may coincide with a change in regulatory approach
as well, with a shift from specific rules to more industry-based standards,
guidelines, or goals.69 As law and regulation become less specific and
66. Clinton Takes Aim at Bureaucracy, CI. TRIB., Feb. 11, 1993, at 28.
67. See, e.g., Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Informal Agency Actions and U.S. Administrative Law:
Informal Procedure in a Global Era, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 665, 666-72 (1994).
68. See, e.g., Mitchell Locin, Gore Plan Depends on Defeating Entrenched Interests, CHi. TRIB.,
Sept. 6, 1993, at 1.
69. Examples of industry-based standards include the EPA's "bubble concept" and certain
contractual approaches to environmental regulation. In the "bubble concept," the EPA places
an imaginary boundary device . . . over a polluting plant or other facility with many
individual sources of air pollution emission. Instead of regulating emissions from each
smokestack, pipe, or fugitive emission source, only the total pollution of the plant is
regulated-as if it was coming from a single imaginary outlet in the bubble.
Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., A Century of Air Pollution Control Law: What's Worked; What's Failed, 21
ENVT'L L. 1549, 1622 (1991).
Similarly, "environmental contracting" entails
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more goal oriented, either on a regional or industrial basis, enforcement can
become less individualistic, and, in that sense, perhaps, less costly. Whether
it will be as effective remains to be seen, but at this point, one can assume
that enforcing a more general set of guidelines or market-oriented rules will
not necessarily result in less effective regulations.
Other ways of partially financing agency missions involve a
reconceptualization of what the agency's mission actually is, and the extent
to which it allows market forces to achieve its goals.7" As we shall see
below, using the market as a regulatory tool may have salutary budgetary
effects, since it may make assumptions about compliance with certain
agency standards easier to make than if specific regulations were involved.
Optimistically, such approaches could also reduce litigation, since
compliance on the part of the regulated should be easier to achieve.
2. Direct Agency Financing-User Fees
New direct approaches to financing federal regulation involve the use
of agency user and filing fees. In some instances agencies' abilities to
charge fees are limited in that they are allowed to impose fees only for
activities that directly benefit specific persons. 7' Nevertheless, there has
been growing acceptance and use of increased filing fees as a means of
raising agency revenues. The Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992,72
for example, will allow the FDA to collect user fees of more than $325
million over five years from research-based pharmaceutical companies.
73
a negotiated agreement between government authorities and industry on comprehensive targets
and timetables for reductions of pollution or other risks in lieu of unilaterally imposed,
piecemeal regulatory requirements for specific types of pollution from particular sources or
process units.
Stewart, supra note 12, at 2090.
70. The FCC, especially throughout the 1980s, significantly redefined its role in such a way as
to make market reforms and approaches appropriate. See supra note 49.
71. See, e.g., Federal Power Comm'n v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345 (1974) (applying
an early version of the Independent Offices Appropriation Act, 31 U.S.C. § 9701 (1952)). For a
discussion of this case, see infra note 95.
72. Prescription Drug User Fee Act, Pub. I. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 (1992). See infra note
73 for details on application fee schedule for 1993-1997.
73. The Prescription Drug User Fee Act created several new kinds of fees, including application
fees, annual product fees, and annual establishment fees. Application fees, paid one time for each
application for approval of a prescription drug product, began at $50,000 per application for which
clinical data with respect to safety or effectiveness were not required in 1993 and will increase to
$116,000 by 1997. For applications requiring clinical data with respect to safety or effectiveness, the
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Total fee revenues were projected as $36 million for 1993, increasing each
year until 1997 when the projected revenue is $84 million. All revenues
from user fees will be dedicated to the sole purpose of new product
approval. These fees are in addition to existing FDA appropriations and
will increase the resources that the FDA devotes to reviewing prescription
drug applications. The fees are expected to cut drug approval time almost
in half, with a goal of approving breakthrough drugs in six months and all
drugs within twelve months from the time a complete new drug application
is submitted. Previously, the FDA simply did not have the resources to
process applications for new products promptly.
User fees can also serve several other important purposes, beyond
simply raising revenues. These purposes include encouraging more efficient
allocation of services between government and the private sector as well as
encouraging privatization of governmental activities.74 The expected
distributional effect of fee-based governmental service is that less of a
service will be demanded so that the decision to reject or employ a user fee
is best viewed as based on a desire to induce a socially-optimal amount of
the underlying good or service. Setting user fees thus allows government
to have an effect on the market without direct regulation.7 5
As for privatization, the way in which the user fees are designed can
have significant implications for the development within the private sector
of alternative sources and complementary services. Privatization concerns
are an extension of efficiency reasoning; some goods are most efficiently
supplied by the government, but could be privately supplied. User fees are
thus appropriate, but if the fees are set too low, the government will be
inefficiently discouraging competition.76 Setting fees at efficient levels
would invite competition from private producers and thus permit discovery
of whether a market failure really does exist.77
application fees are approximately twice as expensive. Without the application fee, an application will
be considered incomplete and will not be considered for approval. Annual product fees are imposed on
prescription drug products each year after they have been approved. The fee per product was $6,000 in
1993, and will increase to $14,000 for 1997. Annual establishment fees are imposed on plants used to
manufacture prescription drugs. Each establishment that manufactures at least one non-exempt
prescription drug is subject to an annual fee, which was $60,000 in 1993 and will increase to $136,000
in 1997.
74. Clayton P. Gillette & Thomas D. Hopkins, Federal User Fees: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 67 B.U. L. REV. 795, 799 (1987).
75. Id. at 801.
76. Id. at 822.
77. Other agencies, such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), also rely on fees.
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Budget realities make agency financing reform necessary. The nature
of the reforms themselves allows the various combinations of public and
private approaches to regulation itself and the tension between complete
rejection of governmental involvement and the reinvention of government
continually to express itself in the various choices that must be made
between total privatization and various degrees of market-based regulation.
B. Agency Structure-A Private-Public Model
In addition to new forms of financing, new regulatory structures also are
beginning to emerge in new contexts. The New Deal agency structure
created a governmental entity expected to be above the political fray-the
independent regulatory commission. These collegial commissions usually
consisted of five or seven administrators appointed for a term of years,
during which they could not, effectively, be removed. The 1970s brought
forth a much more executive-oriented administrative form, such as the
Environmental Protection Agency, as well as greater emphasis on executive
cabinet-level agencies, such as the Department of Labor and the Department
of Commerce. These agencies had a single cabinet member of the executive
branch at their head who served at the pleasure of the President. During the
1980s, the constitutional viability of independent agencies was very much
in question, but the Supreme Court rejected opportunities to adopt separation
of powers approaches that could, in effect, result in declaring certain federal
independent commissions unconstitutional."
The new issues of agency structure emerging in the 1990s seem very
much tied to new mixes of public and private power, including the
occasional adoption of an explicitly private corporate form or structure to
carry out the public's business. The Clinton Administration's proposal, for
example, for restructuring the Federal Aviation Administration is instructive
in this regard. This proposal would remove the air traffic control system
FERC charges filing fees, which are updated annually. Most of the fees are based on cost data from the
most recent year. As of yet, Congress has been unwilling to consider the private benefit received by the
user, and to charge accordingly. Nevertheless, fees may be linked to the costs of running the agency.
FERC is expected to recoup substantial costs by charging such fees. Thus, the charges are perhaps lower
than those that the market would set, but the budgetary concerns are still met. There is probably a "user
surplus," meaning that the users would be willing to pay a higher price, so they receive a benefit from
getting the service at a lower price. Id. at 844.
78. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714, 106 S.Ct. 3181 (1986); see also AMAN, supra note 9, at 93-103.
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from the FAA and make it a wholly government-owned corporation called
the U.S. Air Traffic System Corporation (USATS).7 9  The Report
"recommends that an independent [Air Traffic Safety] Corporation be
established that would be responsible for controlling air traffic, maintaining
ATC equipment, modernizing facilities, performing research into future ATC
system needs and supporting national defense activities."'  The FAA
would retain its "regulatory and safety functions, along with safety oversight
of the USATS."' The USATS would be governed by a Board of
Directors, consisting of the Secretary of Transportation (or designee), the
Secretary of Defense (or designee), eight members appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate, and a C.E.O., who will be chosen
by the Board. 2 The appointed members would represent commercial and
noncommercial aviation interests, airports, labor, and the business
community. 3
The primary reasons for proposing the USATS relate to problems with
acquisitions. Equipment becomes obsolete and government rules and
procedures have made the FAA unable to employ new technologies
effectively. Unlike other federal agencies, the FAA currently is charged
with the operational responsibility of providing a safe, orderly, and
expeditious system of air traffic control that is international in scope and
serves both civil and military users. It is also involved in a highly technical
field and the annual appropriations process is made even more difficult due
to the high-technology, capital-intensive nature of the equipment it needs
and must purchase. The FAA's tasks are made even more complicated by
both its organization as a public agency and its lack of ability to enter into
long-term relationships and to plan procurement before the budgetary
process makes the necessary money available to purchase needed new
equipment. The FAA's budget grew during the 1980s, but the growth was
compensating for underfunding in previous years. Now that the budget
growth appears to be at an end, the infrastructure of the air traffic control
system is still woefully out of date.
79. EXECUTIVE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE TO THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION, AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROL CORPORATION STUDY 124-25 (1994).
80. Id. at 46.
81. Id. at 47.
82. Id. at 48.
83. Id.
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No federal agency currently has the ability to use long-term financing
for capital investments. Without accurate information regarding budgets
beforehand, the FAA cannot enter into contractual obligations without
having the funds in hand to pay for them. By allowing access to private
capital markets and reducing procedural steps required for acquisitions,
restructuring would allow the USATS to overcome these obstacles."
Therefore, the truly innovative characteristic of USATS is its financing
structure. As a financially autonomous corporation, USATS would be able
to finance capital improvements by borrowing from the Treasury or, when
cost-effective, from private capital markets.8 5  The Secretary of
Transportation would be able to disapprove borrowing under limited
conditions, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury. To borrow
on private markets, USATS would have to demonstrate to the Secretary of
the Treasury that doing so is a sound business decision. Financing from the
private markets would provide an incentive to be efficient.8 6
The corporation would be largely outside the normal regulatory regime
as it would be "freed from government acquisition, personnel and budget
constraints."" USATS would be responsible for operating the overall
technical system, while the FAA would continue to retain the authority and
mandate to regulate air traffic safety.8
Currently, there are seven other government corporations financed by
combinations of user fees, appropriations, and grants. Of these eight
entities, USATS would be the only one to be financed by debt, if, as
proposed, USATS is allowed to use debt-financing as part of a long-term
investment strategy to upgrade the system. 9
84. Id. at 37-38.
85. Id. at 124-25.
86. The proposed corporation is supposed to be self-sufficient, relying on user fees. The Air
Traffic Report states that user fees will be set to encourage use of air traffic control safety services. It
also states that user fees will be set at the level of current taxes for one year. However, in 1993, aviation
taxes provided revenues of $5.1 billion, while the FAA's budget authority was $9.1 billion. The Air
Traffic Report resolves this by planning on receiving $1.1 billion in interest from the Trust Fund, $.7
billion from the principal of the Trust Fund, and $2.2 billion from the General Fund in the first year of
operation. Id. at 124-3 1.
87. Id. at 51.
88. Id. at 47.
89. A similar entity to the proposed FAA corporation is the United States Postal Service (USPS).
The USPS is the only current government corporation that began as a large government agency. Similar
to the USATS plan, the USPS had an objective to become self-sustaining, a goal which it has met.
Perhaps a good sign is that the USPS is considered more efficient than its federal predecessor. Id. at
152.
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The hope is that such a corporation will be more businesslike and that
such a structure would permit USATS to overcome chronic impediments to
good management including government procurement regulations, an
inflexible personnel system, and an inability to seek outside financing for
long-term projects.90 Removing the constraints of governmental procedures
is intended to allow the air traffic system to operate more efficiently and to
encourage better productivity while not adversely affecting safety standards.
The proposed USATS is not without its critics. Some raise the question
of whether safety will truly be improved (or at least remain at the same
level) if one body has primarily financial oversight functions to perform
while another has the daily contact with the system, and thus the greater
familiarity with the system.91
For our purposes, however, the structure and goals of the proposed
corporation are illustrative of the new ways in which public and private
power can be conceptualized and combined.
C. The Market as a Regulatory Tool
Not only are the financing and structure of agencies moving in market
directions, but the actual regulatory output of agencies looks more and more
like the market. As noted above, market-oriented, incentive-based regulation
may be easier to enforce than command-control approaches. It also seeks
to minimize the cost of regulation to the regulated and to channel market
forces in a way that maximizes the overlap between the public interest and
individual, corporate private interests. The NPR thus strongly advocates,
where possible, the use of market approaches to regulation, rather than more
intrusive and costly command-control forms of regulation.
By implication, however, such a regulatory approach is more concerned
with an overall sense of direction than with precise results. The law that
results is likely to be less demanding on both government and industry. It
90. Id. at 1-9.
91. See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. H2946, H2947 (daily ed. May 3, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Oberstar). "Reforms that do not dismember the FAA, we believe, are likely to be more effective, less
costly to taxpayers, and to the traveling public and bring greater assurance of continued safety ...."
Id. (emphasis added). Another criticism is that the perceived problems could be fixed without forming
a separate corporation. For example, the FAA procurement system could be streamlined by Executive
Order. To this end, the Secretary of Transportation has been ordered to study alternatives to the current
system other than a separate corporation.
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is less demanding on government because it may be easier or less costly to
enforce. It is less demanding on industry because it seeks to channel, rather
than change, aspects of an industry's operation that arguably are in the
industry's own self-interest.
An example of this approach is the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990
(CAA).92 The CAA uses a marketable permit system for sulphur dioxide
emissions. Congress uses economic-based systems in cases where the
program objective is to assure a "specified level of aggregate emission
reductions."93 The premise is that it does not matter from which sources
pollution originates; rather, the emphasis is on decreasing the total amount
to a set level. This type of market approach is particularly effective where
it is accompanied by an aggressive tracking system to assure that the
expected emission reductions are, in fact, achieved.
A market program will produce emission reductions in those areas where
reduction is least expensive and emissions will continue in areas where it is
very difficult or expensive to reduce emissions. Those who sell their
permits will have funds to further reduce their emissions or to investigate
new methods of doing so. Such an approach and program should lead
overall to a lower level of emissions.
Other forms of market-based regulations include greater reliance on
taxes, rather than regulation, even market-based regulation. The imposition
of higher costs on certain actors forces them to internalize external costs.
User fees, as discussed above, can also have regulatory effects.
Both the collection and dissemination of information can also play a
major regulatory role. When airfares were deregulated and the service level
of some airlines subsequently seemed to drop rather than improve, the
Department of Transportation required reports from the airlines regarding
lost luggage, on-time arrivals, and the like." Providing consumers with
information concerning their effectiveness was, thus, an effective but non-
directive form of regulation.
Such approaches continue to provide a role for the national government.
Moreover, they link up conceptually with globalization and global legal
92. Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7407-7671 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993)).
93. Henry A. Waxman, An Overview of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 21 ENVT'L L.
1721, 1752 (1991).
94. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE ON COMPETITION IN THE
U.S. DOMESTIC AIRLINE INDUSTRY (1990).
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regimes in interesting ways. Since enforcement and monitoring are two of
the most significant problems encountered by international regulatory
regimes, domestic regimes that seek to minimize enforcement costs and
intrusiveness, while still trying to accomplish certain regulatory ends, may
provide important models for international regulatory approaches.
Moreover, given the global aspects of domestic regulation discussed above,
it is not surprising that domestic and international regulatory approaches
begin to resemble one another.
All of these changes-in agency financing, organization, and the form
and substance of agency regulation-may (and, in fact, do) raise a variety
of domestic political and legal issues that are beyond the scope of this
paper.95 I wish, however, to conclude by returning to Luard's proposition
regarding local politics and to our consideration of the relationship of place
to globalization and place to law.
95. For example, several constitutional issues arise from the imposition of user fees. Although
Congress clearly has the ability to collect user fees, as a practical necessity it must delegate that power
to the various federal administrative agencies; however, various challenges to the agencies' ability to
charge such fees have been brought.
In the companion cases of National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974),
and Federal Power Comm'n v. New England Power Co., 425 U.S. 345 (1974), the Supreme Court gave
its interpretation of the Independent Offices Appropriation Act (IOAA)-the primary statutory
authorization for the imposition of user fees. 31 U.S.C. § 9701 (1988) (the cases refer to an older
version of the statute, 31 U.S.C. § 483(a) (1952)). The Court focused on Congress's. ability to delegate
a taxing power to federal agencies. In National Cable Television, the majority opinion stated that user
fees can only be charged if the payer received some benefit from the provided service; otherwise the fee
acts as an impermissible tax. 415 U.S. at 340.
A closer reading of the opinion reveals that such a fee could be imposed given the proper
congressional delegation. Id. at 340. In the Court's view, the IOAA did not intend to delegate the power
to tax to the agencies; however, the opinion suggests that given an adequate congressional mandate and
proper procedural safeguards, agencies could impose user fees irrespective of any benefit received by the
payer. Id. at 341.
Another constitutional issue revolves around the imposition of user fees for constitutionally
protected activities, such as free speech and the freedom of assembly. No per se rule has developed;
instead the courts have focused on the effect a user fee would have on the protected activity. The
litigation of this issue is concentrated at the state and local levels. See, e.g., Central Fla. Nuclear Freeze
Campaign v. Walsh, 774 F.2d 1515 (1 lth Cir. 1985) (invalidating ordinance requiring police service
fees), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1120 (1986); Eastern Conn. Citizens Action Group v. Powers, 723 F.2d
1050 (2d Cir. 1983) (invalidating state department of transportation administrative fee and liability
insurance requirement for political march).
Aside from these constitutional issues, there remain a number of statutory interpretation problems
with the IOAA. The statute provides little guidance as to which services should require a fee and what
amount that fee should be. For a detailed account of these statutory problems, as well as other
constitutional issues surrounding user fees, see Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 74, at 822-35.
REJECTION, RELOCATION, OR REINVENTION?
V. CONCLUSION
Underlying the regulatory reform rhetorics of the Reagan-Bush and
Clinton-Gore Administrations are important philosophical differences
regarding the role of government, especially the national government. These
differences are now highlighted by the intensity of the anti-government
approach currently advocated by the newly-elected Republican legislative
majority. These differences have significant implications for the role of law,
not only nationally, but internationally as well. Though the actual market
approaches to regulatory reform currently employed and proposed by
Democrats and Republicans do not differ considerably from one
administration to the next, the Clinton-Gore view of the national government
as a potentially positive force is a significant departure in terms of how
national and global legal approaches might intersect and reinforce one
another. In a sense, then, Luard is correct when he observes that national
party politics and electoral outcomes do not determine the shape of change.
But that is only for the present. In the longer term, it is more likely that
stronger legal regimes will develop on a global basis if the global issues
involved have a national regulatory counterpart, and if national regulatory
approaches are viewed in the context of a positive national governmental
approach by the voting public that has the rest of the world also in mind.
A market approach to law-however weak-that respects the role of law
at the national level is likely to facilitate U.S. participation in new
international legal structures now forming, such as the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in GATT,96 the environmental regimes that may
develop regarding climate change, or new provisions extending the Montreal
Protocol on the Protection of the Ozone Layer. Those reformers who
emphasize privatization and the market as an end in itself, however,
supported world trade, but were very skeptical, indeed, of any additional
regulatory aspects of that agreement. Many members of Congress, including
some who supported the NAFTA, thus expressed opposition to GATT
96. Interestingly, the dispute over signing on to GATT in the U.S. had little to do with free trade
but a great deal to do with whether or not we were willing to be bound by an international dispute
resolution tribunal we did not fully control. See Amy Bornus & Douglas Harbrecht, China, Russia,
Bosnia-and Congress, Bus. WK. (international ed.), Nov. 28, 1994, at 16, available in LEXIS, News
Library, MAGS File.
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because of their more fundamental opposition to the regulatory aspects of
the World Trade Organization (WTO). 97
A regulatory approach that uses the market as a means rather than an
end in itself can encourage global legal systems to develop more easily. But
in terms of this symposium's theme, the more important factor in the future
of "reinvented government" will be the extent to which a politics can
develop that enables citizens in individual jurisdictions to transcend the idea
that their "place" is limited by national boundaries or their own particular
geography. A sense of place that is at least regional, if not global, can help
focus attention on common issues with a view toward harmonizing domestic
legal regimes with the law of other jurisdictions or new international treaties.
A sense of place that coincides with the scale of the problems involved by
definition acknowledges the common interests essential to successful
negotiation, compromise, and conflict resolution. For law to matter
nowadays, a flexible sense of place is crucial, since important new law will
forge linkages between places in the conventional sense of that term. If, on
the other hand, the globe is viewed as simply a composite of potential,
largely undifferentiated manufacturing sites, the future importance of law
will be impoverished, since such a view of the world does not engage
people's sense of self, society, or interests, except in highly restricted terms.
97. The Uruguay Round contains a binding dispute settlement system, which GATT had been
lacking to this point. WTO Agreement, supra note 20, art. III. Its proponents argued that the United
States stands only to benefit from the changes because in the past it was the United States that raised the
most allegations of unfair trade practices. U.S. negotiators actually worked to strengthen the agreement's
dispute resolution powers because of this fact. But as power in Congress began to shift to the purely
market-oriented reformers, the strengthened dispute resolution system of GATT received the most
criticism in the U.S. This was because the market-oriented free trade principles of GATT established
a regulatory body to implement them. The World Trade Organization would be a permanent institution
with a sizable structure. Among other bodies for specific types of trade, there would be a Ministerial
Conference, General Council, Dispute Settlement Body, and Secretariat. Id. art. IV-VI. Each Member
would have equal representation in both the Ministerial Conference and the General Council. Id. Yet,
it is important to note that the WTO's primary role is only to resolve disputes. As such, it is not a
proactive regulatory body with rulemaking powers.
GATT decisions previously required consensus, meaning that a panel ruling could be blocked, but
WTO rulings cannot be vetoed. The Uruguay Round now provides for a majority vote if consensus
cannot be reached with each Member having one vote. This was the most contentious point for the
WTO's critics in Congress. Although he ultimately voted for GATT, the new House Speaker, Newt
Gingrich, considered the WTO as the central flaw of the GATT, fearing a loss of sovereignty. Had the
measure been voted on by the 104th Congress, rather than the 103rd, it might have failed. See John
Maggs, Gingrich Backs Off on Pressure Over WTO, J. COM., June 13, 1994, at Al; John Maggs,
Hearings Likely on Claims WTO Would Threaten US. Sovereignty, J. COM., May 9, 1994, at A3; Mr.
Gingrich's False Alarm on Trade, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1994, at D16.
